University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers

Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities

2001

John's $12 tonic: Press coverage of the government's selling of a private
health insurance rebate
Stacy M. Carter
University of Wollongong, stacyc@uow.edu.au

Simon Chapman
University of Sydney

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers
Part of the Education Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Carter, Stacy M. and Chapman, Simon, "John's $12 tonic: Press coverage of the government's selling of a
private health insurance rebate" (2001). Faculty of Social Sciences - Papers. 3629.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/3629

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

John's $12 tonic: Press coverage of the government's selling of a private health
insurance rebate
Abstract
Objective: To document representations of the 1998 introduction of a 30% rebate on private health
insurance in the three most-read daily Sydney newspapers. Methods: Thematic frame analysis of 131
newspaper articles. Results: The rebate was opposed through two frames: that it was ineffective and
unfair, and that it was politically motivated. Four supportive frames were more complex: the rebate was
justified by claims that public health care was collapsing, that responsible citizens should pay for their
own health care, and that individuals would benefit financially. There was also a focus on the political
battle in the Senate. The newspaper with the readership least likely to benefit from the rebate supported it
most strongly. Conclusions: Framing was strongly episodic (two dimensional, decontextualised and casestudy based), limiting political accountability, and the anti-rebate case was presented less memorably.
Community action around the issue was not encouraged, individual responsibility was emphasised and
universal health care was not promoted as fair or necessary. Different readerships received different
messages about the rebate. Implications: There is an urgent need to promote the value of the public
health care system and make the future of Medicare compelling for news editors and the public.

Keywords
private, selling, government's, coverage, press, tonic:, rebate, $12, insurance, john's, health

Disciplines
Education | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Publication Details
Carter, S. & Chapman, S. (2001). John's $12 tonic: Press coverage of the government's selling of a private
health insurance rebate. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 25 (3), 265-271.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/3629

Health and Health Care

John’s $12 tonic: Press coverage of the government’s
selling of a private health insurance rebate
Stacy Carter and Simon Chapman
Department of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of Sydney,
New South Wales

Abstract
Objective: To document representations of
the 1998 introduction of a 30% rebate on
private health insurance in the three mostread daily Sydney newspapers.

O

n 10 December 1998, Australian
federal politicians emerged late
after a ‘knife edge vote’.1 “It’s
been a long night, it’s been a hard fight but
we’ve delivered on the promise,” said the
Health Minister. “We are immensely pleased.
It’s a great result for Australia.”2 The Government had ‘delivered’ a 30% tax rebate on
premiums for all Australians with private
health insurance.3 The bill was opposed
strongly by Labor, the Greens and, after initial attempts at a compromise deal, the Australian Democrats.3 Independent Senator
Brian Harradine promised to block the bill,6,7
but, after a last-minute meeting with the
Prime Minister, relented.2 Since its implementation the cost of the initiative has been
estimated to be between $A2.5 and $A3 billion a year (for comparison, the reported
health and aged care budget bottom-line for
2000/01 is $A135.4 billion).4,5
This paper analyses coverage of the rebate
in the three most popular daily newspapers
sold in Sydney, from the first explicit mention of the rebate (14 August 1998) to the
passing of the rebate in the Senate (last report 26 December 1998). Our analysis rests
on a belief that the market fails for health,
with subsequent need for government intervention to make health care accessible to all
regardless of income. This position is consistent with support for Medicare, which
finances private and public hospitals and
general practice in Australia through progressive taxation.8
We will focus on media ‘framings’ of the
30% rebate. ‘Frames’ are the taken-forgranted assumptions through which the

‘news’ is selected and presented by media
professionals. Although frames influence the
version of the ‘news’ which is promoted, they
can seem ‘natural’ to an uncritical audience,
and even to news professionals themselves.9,10 ‘Framing’ subtly alters the presentation of problems and their solutions, with
resultant ‘framing effects’: changes in consumers’ perceptions of what an issue is ‘really about’, who is responsible for it and
whether change is possible.9 Iyengar distinguishes episodic framing, which is concrete
and focuses on case studies or events, from
thematic framing, which is more conceptual,
facilitating a deeper understanding through
contextualisation.9 He proposes that the
dominance of episodic framing diminishes
government and societal accountability by
communicating that individuals are responsible for their own circumstances. Charlotte
Ryan suggests the need for ‘mobilising’
frames, which present problems as collective and encourage community action, avoiding the ‘victim blaming’ and individualism
that the new public health also warns against
and argues that, rather than explicate a core
argument, news is more likely to use symbol, metaphor, catch-phrases and anecdote
to make a frame ‘real’ for audiences.10,11

Methods: Thematic frame analysis of 131
newspaper articles.

Results: The rebate was opposed through
two frames: that it was ineffective and
unfair, and that it was politically motivated.
Four supportive frames were more
complex: the rebate was justified by claims
that public health care was collapsing, that
responsible citizens should pay for their
own health care, and that individuals would
benefit financially. There was also a focus
on the political battle in the Senate. The
newspaper with the readership least likely
to benefit from the rebate supported it most
strongly.

Conclusions: Framing was strongly
episodic (two dimensional,
decontextualised and case-study based),
limiting political accountability, and the antirebate case was presented less memorably.
Community action around the issue was
not encouraged, individual responsibility
was emphasised and universal health care
was not promoted as fair or necessary.
Different readerships received different
messages about the rebate.

Implications: There is an urgent need to
promote the value of the public health care
system and make the future of Medicare
compelling for news editors and the public.
(Aust N Z J Public Health 2001; 25: 265-71)

Method
We searched for instances of the keywords
‘health insurance’ and ‘rebate’ between
1 August 1998 and 31 January 1999 in three
newspapers. The Daily Telegraph and The
Australian were accessed via Reuters’ Business Briefing,12 a web-based database. The
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Table 1: Demographics of weekday readership for the three newspapers analysed.
Quintilea

The Daily Telegraph
n (’000s)
%

The Sydney Morning Herald
n (’000s)
%

The Australian
n (’000s)
%

AB

211

18

391

46

65

56

C

250

21

212

25

28

24

D

255

22

132

16

14

12

E

242

21

75

9

4

3

FG
TOTAL

210

18

40

5

5

4

1,168

100

850

100

116

100

Note:
(a) Newspaper advertising or circulation departments commission market research to map their readerships for the information of potential advertisers. The five
categories (quintiles) displayed above are the groupings used to measure socio-economic status (SES). AB is the highest SES, FG the lowest. Allocation to a
group is determined by a combination of income, education and occupation. Data acquired via personal communication with the publishers based on Roy Morgan
polling from December 2000. Percentages rounded.

Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) was accessed via a CD ROM
archive.13 These papers are read by different demographic groups
(see Table 1). The Australian’s profile is the most affluent, followed by the SMH. The Daily Telegraph’s readership is spread
evenly across socio-economic groups.
The period of coverage can be divided into seven episodes (see
Table 2). The ‘main event’ in each of these episodes often provided the peg or journalistic pretext for media coverage.
The search produced 131 articles, 51 (39%) each from The
Australian and the SMH, and 29 (22%) from The Daily Telegraph,
which were divided into chronological groupings according to
the episodes in Table 2. Using Ryan’s framework, 18 mutually
exclusive frames were identified, in six major groupings.10
Because a single article often presented a balance between several frames, articles were not coded for a primary or dominant
frame, but for all frames present (mean=1.96 frames per article).

Results
A total of 257 instances of the six frames were identified. The
frames are detailed in Tables 3 and 4 and their frequencies in
Table 5.

Frames used by opponents of the rebate
The case against the rebate in the media studied incorporated
just two primary frames.
Opposing frame one: It won’t work and it’s not fair
This frame presented the rebate as a payout to rich consumers
who would have remained insured regardless. It was the most
common frame, occurring in 53% of articles, equally prominent
in The Australian and the SMH but rare in The Daily Telegraph,
despite the potential appeal to its lower-income readership. The
frame peaked in the week of the Senate debate, as Opposition
argument generated news stories.14-18 Labor warned that ‘Australia’s richest 20% would get almost half the rebate,19 that ‘millionaires would qualify,14 and that Medicare ‘[would] not survive
another Coalition Government.20 Journalists, particularly in the
SMH, also argued this frame in opinion pieces:
‘If you’ve heard of politicians throwing money at a problem, this is
the classic case. Rather than tackle the real issues, [The Prime
Minister John] Howard just wrote another cheque on the
taxpayers’ account and looked the other way. It would be misleading to say that Mr Howard’s new rebate papers over the cracks. It
actually makes the cracks wider.’21

Table 2: Episodes in the period of coverage.
Dates

Main events

Prior to 13 August 1998

A limited means tested rebate is made available from July 1997. This rebate is intended to maintain or increase
the number of people with private health insurance but is deemed to be a failure. Membership of private health
funds is reported to be shrinking.

13 August 1998

The Federal Government announces its ‘family friendly’ tax package, which includes the introduction of a
Goods and Services Tax (GST) and the 30% rebate.

1 September 1998

Election campaign 1998 begins.
Taxation and health become dominant election issues.

3 October 1998

Federal election.
The conservative Liberal-National Party coalition is returned to power.

Week of 9 November 1998

Legislation including the 30% rebate introduced.

Week of 23 November 1998

Senate begins debating the legislation.

7 December 1998

Senate committee reports on the issue.

Night of 10 December 1998

Legislation passed in the Senate.

1 January 1999

Rebate introduced.
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‘The Government is spending $1300 million of the taxpayers’ money
to save the taxpayer $350 million … it’s a total nonsense …
taxpayers would spend at least $2500 to buy each new member.’22

Although frequent, this theme rarely dominated, instead functioning as a final counterweight inserted to ‘balance’ the Government’s view.
Opposing frame two: Bribery and corruption
Accusations of unfair dealing by the Coalition occurred in 35%
of articles, and increased after the rebate was passed. Under the
headline, ‘Fistful-of-dollars PM pumped up as never before’, senior journalist Paul Kelly wrote: “Howard knew how hard it was to
sell a GST so he’s gone for overkill … [the rebate is a] targeted
bribe [by a] fistful-of-dollars PM pumped up for battle. Frankly,
if this doesn’t sell the GST then it’s beyond salvation. A very
hefty price is being paid.”23
Other journalists agreed.24 The Government’s real priorities were
... “to buy votes rather than improve healthcare.”25 The rebate had

… “bought off the ire of the mere 30 per cent of the population
who remain in private health insurance, bought off the doctors,
private hospitals and health funds with a vested interest in the
insurance system and bought [Howard] another term in office
without a commitment to deal with root causes.”21 The Coalition
was siphoning public money off to the private sector:26-29 the “vast
medical industry fed to obesity on the public teat.”30 One journalist wrote:
‘As for the 70 per cent of the population not covered by private
health insurance and with no intention of taking it out, they have a
right to feel hard done by, particularly by the Coalition. What other
industry, particularly in an era of shrinking Government, could
expect to receive a 30% subsidy from taxpayers for its operations?
Who, moreover, in the face of the failure of previous generous efforts to prop them up, could expect the Government to shovel everincreasing amounts in their direction?’31

The Bill seemed doomed until eleventh-hour negotiations between Howard and Brian Harradine, an independent senator who

Table 3: The two frames used by opponents of the rebate. Framework by Charlotte Ryan.10
Package

Frames
Core frame
Core position
(the issue is…)

Symbols

Supporting arguments

It is not fair to implement a
rebate that will go mostly to
the well off. Governments
should operate effectively and
spend wisely.

It won’t work and The impact of
it’s not fair
the rebate on
the health
care system

The rebate is unjustifiable
because it will not improve
the health care system,
wastes precious health
dollars and only benefits the rich.

Subsidising gym membership
and tennis racquets.
Millionaires would qualify.

Bribery and
corruption

The rebate is being used to
buy votes and prop up private
health: it’s a giant swindle.

‘Fistful of dollars prime minister’. The rebate is driven by Liberal
Fat Cats.
party support for the private
The Big Steal.
sector. Governments should
act in the best interests of the
whole population, not just the
faction that supports them.

Political
transparency
and fair dealing

Table 4: The four frames used by proponents of the rebate. Framework by Charlotte Ryan 10
Frames
Core frame
Core position
(the issue is…)

Symbols

The end is nigh

The future of the
private health
industry

Apocalypse/ extinction.
If people have paid for private
Health system as dying patient. health insurance it should
cover all their expenses.
The public system relies on the
private system for survival and
will collapse without it.

Make my day

Political supremacy The rebate is the basis of a
Health minister as action hero.
and the right to
symbolic war between ideologies:
govern
the victor will have the upper hand
in other policy areas.

Strong personalities and the
drama of the contest drive politics.
Whoever wins the battle over the
rebate will win on GST. If a
Government is voted in on a
policy they have a right to
implement it.

You get what
you deserve

Who should be
responsible for
financing
healthcare

The Government wants to reward
responsible citizens who finance
their own private health cover
and thus have access to the
choice and quality that
private health provides.

Public health stretched to
breaking point.
Rich greedy freeloaders.
The ‘battlers’ are being robbed.
Only those who try to help
themselves deserve help.

Battling Aussies deserve a fair go
and the Government should
provide it for them. The very rich
are fair game.
Paying your own way is more
responsible than relying on the
public purse.

What’s in it
for me?

The financial effect
of the rebate on
individuals

The rebate will provide
individuals with extra money.

Christmas present for families.

The rebate is a handout – what is
important is whether you, the
reader, will get more money.

Package
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The collapse of the private
health industry is a disaster
that must be averted.

Supporting arguments
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Table 5: Frequency of frame occurrence.
Number of Per cent of 131 articles
references containing this framea

Percentage of total references to this frame occurring in the...
Australian
Daily Telegraph
Sydney Morning Herald

It won’t work and it’s not fair

70

53

43

14

The end is nigh

50

38

50

20

30

Bribery and corruption

46

35

48

9

43

Make my day

44

34

36

16

48

You get what you deserve

39

28

26

41

13

8

6

0

75

25

What’s in it for me?

43

Note:
(a) Articles were coded for all frames present, thus percentages add to >100

held the deciding vote. These negotiations were called immediately into question. ‘Howard and the health funds have pulled off
The Big Steal’6 wrote one journalist and another, under the headline ‘Psst, wanna buy a deal on rebates?’32 wrote: “Brian Harradine
has been duped. Suckered. Sold a pup. He has given away a principle for the nearest thing to nothing you can get.” Harradine fell
for a “billion-dollar bribe” and was “conned by experts.”7 The
account of the deal had overtones of a seduction – Harradine
“teased the Government all night”33 and then refused to kiss and
tell the next morning, giving no explanation for his turnaround.7

Frames used by proponents of the rebate
Proponents of the rebate received more media coverage for a
greater number of frames, which were more memorable and dramatic. There were four rebate-supporting frames in our sample.
Supporting frame 1: The end is nigh
This frame promised a non-specific but inexorable future apocalypse if Australians reneged on private insurance. This alarmism
featured in 38% of articles in the study period. It was the dominant theme in 1998 before the rebate was announced, invoked in
all three papers but sustained particularly by a single journalist in
The Australian over some months.34-37
Images included “desertion”,38 “plummeting membership”,35
“exodus”,34 a “China Syndrome Meltdown”39 and “alarming and
catastrophic decline.”37 The rebate was the “last chance saloon”
for the private sector.40 “Failure to support the rebate [would] drive
a nail in the coffin of the private sector and a knife in the back of
public hospitals”,40 with “private health insurance becoming
extinct and only public hospitals and waiting lists surviving.”41
The metaphor of health-system-as-ailing-patient served this frame
well, with headlines such as ‘Cash injection ruled out as funds
bleed’42 and ‘Pre poll bid to resuscitate health funds.’36
‘The gap’ (the difference between the fees charged by doctors
and the amount paid by insurers) was part of this impending doom:
a cost “saddled by the consumer”.32,43,44 Poignant case studies
illustrated the impact of ‘the gap’ on individuals. It was an injustice, a disincentive for consumers and a priority for policy attention. Only Mark Ragg in The Australian pointed out that “Medicare
is the ultimate ‘no gap’ policy,”32 providing comprehensive cover
according to ability to pay.
268

With the notable exception of two SMH articles during the Senate debate,21,45 no journalist addressed the key question: what,
exactly, was the problem with a decline in private health insurance coverage? Decreased membership primarily diminishes private health insurance shareholder coffers (monies which are not
necessarily spent on health care). Health insurance was held predominantly by the relatively well-off. Because of taxation arrangements, decreased membership would have required more
non-privately insured high-income earners to pay a 1% tax levy,
potentially increasing funds available for Medicare (if they were
hypothecated). Because of legislative arrangements it would have
obliged the Federal Government to give the States more money
for health care. Thus it could have effectively increased the taxfunded pool for public hospitals and community health. But this
possibility was overridden by a doomsday dramatisation of a bleak,
frightening, uninsured future.
Supporting frame 2: Make my day
In 34% of articles, journalists focused on the fight for political
supremacy that the rebate debate represented, first at the election
and then in the Senate. This frame dominated in the week running up to the Senate vote (46% of all frames coded in this period). It was especially prominent in the SMH (48% of occurrences
of this frame) and much less prominent in the Telegraph (16%).
The sides lined up: in the blue corner, the Liberal/National
Coalition, the Australian Medical Association and the private
health industry; in the red corner the Labor Party, the Australian
Democrats, the Doctors’ Reform Society, consumers, some notfor-profit private hospitals and the public health system. In the
middle, two independents with the balance of power. Howard went
to the October 1998 election on a number of promises, including
the rebate and, more controversially, a national goods and services tax (GST). If the Liberals could not pass a paltry 30% insurance rebate through the Senate, what chance did they have in
succeeding with a comprehensive GST later in the year?
The episodic framing of this political jousting often took precedence over the detail and implications of the bill itself, which
was merely a vehicle illustrating the Government’s skills in power
brokerage. The Democrats disappeared from the headlines once
their compromise was rejected,46,47 leaving a standoff between
Labor and the Coalition with the independents as wild cards,
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holding the fate of the nation in their hands.48 Health Minister
Wooldridge played a Dirty Harry-style action hero, promising to
play hardball and issuing direct threats. “Make our day: NSW
Labor will pay the price”, he promised.49 “I tell you, if Labor
votes against it we will go after them in their marginal seats.”50
Supporting frame 3: You get what you deserve
This frame communicated a key subtext of the proponent’s
arguments: that those who could not afford private cover were not
trying hard enough. The rebate was a reward for those responsible citizens who financed their own cover, often at great personal
cost to themselves. The Government was champion of the hardworking low-income earners who were prepared to make sacrifices to access quality care.
The Health Minister was clear about these underlying principles. “We are making a philosophical statement that we wish to
help those people who are trying to help themselves,”18 he said:
those with insurance were “making sacrifices” to be “self-reliant” and thus deserved the “control and choice that private health
offers”.51 Even more remarkable was the Prime Minister’s statement that level of income (and thus, we assume by inference,
equity) was “not the point:”52
Mr Howard … said he would accept the 30 per cent saving, although
he didn’t need the money. “I am earning, by community standards,
a very high income,” Mr Howard said … “but that’s not the point.
The name of the game is to get volume, to get large numbers of
people taking out health insurance to take the load off the public
hospital system”.52

This frame occurred in 28% of articles. The Daily Telegraph
promoted it particularly strongly: 29% of the Telegraph’s coded
frames were in this category, in contrast to 9% of the total frames
in The Australian and 13% in the SMH. Forty-one per cent of
occurrences of this frame were in the Telegraph, despite the small
number of articles it ran on the rebate overall.
The arguments were multifaceted. The private system was
framed as superior and aspirational, aided by dramatic characterisations of the public system as chaotic, consisting of “stretched
budgets, overcrowded emergency departments and an ever ready
supply of patients waiting to fill dwindling beds.”45 The need to
“ease the burden on the public system” was a given.53 The rich
were accused of exploiting this public system, which would be
freed up if they behaved decently and took out private insurance.45,54 According to the Prime Minister, Labor was “spawning
a new species of elite Australian: Macklin’s Millionaires” (named
after the shadow health minister) “who opted out of private cover
and put pressure on the public system.”50 Despite the potential
for the progressive Medicare levy to subsidise care for the less
well off from the contributions of the wealthy, a caricature of the
greedy rich and the intuitive logic that “those who can pay should
pay” often won out, particularly in The Daily Telegraph.40,55,56
Even more remarkable was “the rhetorical battle for the battlers.”50 The Coalition emphasised that it was “going into bat for
the low-income earners of Australia,”25,57,58 a masterful counter
to any argument that the rebate was inequitable:
”[Howard said the rebate was] a boon for low income earners
…

2001 VOL. 25 NO. 3

who scrimp and save to give themselves the security of private health
insurance.”50
“John Howard warned yesterday 700,000 low-income earners would
be penalised if enabling legislation failed in the Senate… “this proposition that everybody who’s got private health insurance is a millionaire is absolute nonsense”, Mr Howard told Parliament. “I say
to the low-income earners of Australia, I want to say to the pensioners…we will help you keep your private health insurance.”59

This stance was enriched by claims that the wealthy subsidised
the poor in health funds46,56 (how this applied to flat fee private
insurance and not a progressive Medicare levy was never
explained) and by the mandate of Howard’s electoral success. This
mandate was something of a mantra in late 1998, and was used to
sell the Liberal-National coalition as being closer to the people
than Labor.60 “We put policy out and we defended it and we won
the damned election,”60 Howard declared, and the people’s “beloved Labor Party”61 “will have a lot of explaining to do if they
rob Australians of a $650-$700 rebate.”47 (our emphasis)
Supporting frame 4: What’s in it for me?
This final frame focused on the financial benefits of the rebate
for individuals. There were few occurrences – only eight articles
in 131, and The Daily Telegraph led the way with six of the eight
occurrences. After the rebate was passed the Telegraph’s copy was
suddenly peppered with families and their savings, couched in
terms of extra money for Christmas. The rebate was a “rescue
package”, a “pre-Christmas boon”, a “gift for families”, and the
impact was “stunning”, with the industry reporting “floods” and
“blitzes” of calls and “skyrocketing” membership, despite negative reports elsewhere.3,44,62 Most extraordinary was the headline
‘John’s $12 tonic’ the morning after the vote,52 based on the calculation that the average family would save $12 a week on top
cover.

Discussion
Sydney print media reportage provides little evidence of strategic advocacy against the rebate. None of the frames fit within
Ryan’s ‘mobilising’ schema: framing suggested that the Government, rather than the community, had the power to decide, and no
focal point for resistance was apparent. Opposition arguments
came largely from the Senate during debate. Public opposition
was rarely reported, and occasional comments from the Doctor’s
Reform Society were drowned out by the AMA and the private
health industry. Policy-by-cash-incentive was reinforced by the
framing of health financing as an individual responsibility and
the promotion of $12 in consumers’ pockets over societal equity.
The emphasis on political battles and bribes distracted from the
consequences for the health care system and was highly demobilising. This illustrates the undermining of accountability that
occurs when the ability to pass bills becomes the measure of political performance, and could have been subverted by framing
Harradine as a David fighting the Goliath of the Government’s
unjust policies instead of as an innocent too easily seduced.
In Iyengar’s terms, episodic framing won the day, with the most
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dramatic example being the unexplained but frightening threat of
health system collapse. Of the frames represented, only “you get
what you deserve” and “it won’t work and it’s not fair” could be
seen as thematic, constituting 109 out of 259 coded frame occurrences. The latter was not enriched by imagery, case studies or
metaphors. Reports using this frame relied on fact-based argument, and did not highlight societies and individuals who had
suffered under the privatisation of health care. In contrast, “you
get what you deserve” was complex and rhetorical, and was the
most ‘de-mobilising’ frame. It was reinforced by the predicted
collapse of the public health system. It resonated with Australian
traditions of disdain for the excessively wealthy and a fair go for
the underdog, using images more common in Labor campaigning of hard-working battlers desperate for a helping hand to cover
the expense of good quality care. It benefited from case studies
of people disadvantaged by the gap, providing the Coalition with
the opportunity to ‘solve’ a problem through their action on
insurance. It was also sympathetic to Howard’s love of individual
responsibility and decreased Government provision of public services. It relied on an insidious subtext, implying that only those
who “take responsibility for their own health” (read: are able to
pay for private insurance) deserve assistance, facilitating victim
blaming and permitting Government to abdicate responsibility.
Something that rarely emerged in the debate was the idea of
universal health care as a basic entitlement in a fair society. Those
with private insurance could have been framed as being cheated
by an inefficient, profit-driven system, particularly by reframing
‘gap’ stories as doctors and insurers cooperatively fleecing the
consumer. Contributions to Medicare could have been framed as
responsible social participation and contributions to private
insurance as building a five-star walled society, starving Medicare of funds through exemptions and state-federal cost shifting.
Framing of the public healthcare system generally may need attention: constant doomsday scenarios of a failing public system
may devalue it and make it easier to discard. Overall, this study
suggests a need to identify and promote the achievements of the
public system and to frame healthcare as a fundamental public
expenditure.
There was some evidence in this sample that it is possible for
a particular ideology to dominate in one publication but not in
another, potentially resulting in framing effects that differ between
readerships. In this case the differences were highly ironic given
that the paper that most aggressively promoted the rebate was
most read by the demographic least likely to benefit from it. Segmented approaches by advocates are needed to ensure that the
messages provided to different media meet both the conventions
of that media and the needs of its particular audience.
This study is limited by three major caveats, which also suggest directions for further research. First, if resources had been
infinite, the sample would have included other media products,
such as The Australian Financial Review, whose readership stood
to gain from the rebate, major dailies from other states, and
television and radio. Second, it should be stressed that the best
attempts at advocacy do not necessarily make it to final copy: the
270

lack of representation of the anti-rebate case does not mean that
advocates were not trying hard enough, it may be the result of
impediments beyond the advocates’ control. Finally, it should be
noted that media advocacy is not everything: direct lobbying of
politicians, for example, can be at least equally influential, and is
not considered here.
Health financing is not much of a story. Chronic, complex and
dry, the issues are hard to pin down to events and individuals. In
this case an event (the Senate vote) made it newsworthy and
became the focus. There were in-depth opinion pieces, both supportive and critical, that framed the issues thematically and encouraged a deeper understanding. But the majority of pieces
emphasised the political process rather than its implications. From
our perspective, a profound shift in favour of an unworkable,
profit-driven system was often framed as a political triumph for
responsible Australian families and their quest for self-determination. Episodic framing defeated political accountability, as
Howard appeared to solve, rather than create, a problem.
Since 1999, the Howard Government has further pursued its
objective of providing “choice through private health insurance”,
supported by a $16 million mass media campaign.4 In March 2001,
the health funds reportedly had an “embarrassment of riches” as
a result of these policies, making a profit in the last financial year
of $344 million, in contrast to the $11 million loss made in 1998.63
Sadly, these changes have been opposed by few in the public domain. There is an urgent need in this climate to fight for the future of Medicare by providing an alternative view and making it
compelling for both news editors and the public.
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